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Abstract
Many power grid applications rely on the timesynchronized measurement data collected by phasor
measurement units (PMUs) and or Merging Units
(MUs)). The synchronization of data from multiple
PMUs and MUs relies on the global positioning system
(GPS) to provide the time reference. The civilian GPS
receivers used in PMU operate according to the
publicly available mechanism. Therefore, attackers can
easily generate false GPS signals with low-cost portable
devices. During the spoofing attacks, the signal received
by the PMUs and MUs is arbitrarily modified by the
attacker without being detected, leading to the
malfunction of other applications in the power system
including transmission line protection. In this paper, we
investigate the effect of GPS spoofing attack on
transmission line differential protection schemes based
on PMUs, including the percentage differential method
and alpha-plane protection method. The mis-operation
of these relays is observed during GPS spoofing attacks.
In addition, we propose a quasi-dynamic stateestimation-based method to detect GPS spoofing
attacks, identify the affected PMUs, correct the
compromised data, and enable the continuous and
reliable operation of the relays. Numerical results show
that the proposed method detects the GPS spoofing
successfully and the recovered measurement data
eliminate the misoperation of line differential
protection.

1. Introduction
The Global Positioning System (GPS), is designed
to provide accurate location and time for various civil
and military applications around the world. GPS
receivers calculate the local coordination and time based
on the signal transmitted from multiple satellites. For
instance, the Phasor Measurement Units (PMUs)
network, which is widely used in power grids [1], relies
on the GPS to produce time-synchronized measurement.
Most of the PMUs utilize the civilian version of the GPS
signal[2], which is much less encrypted than the military
GPS signal. The weakness in the encryption can be
utilized by malicious attackers to fabricate false signals.
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For example, attackers can change the time reference by
an attacker-selected offset. The target will receive the
contaminated signal with a wrong time reference. The
attacker starts with transmitting a replica of the genuine
GPS signal. Next, the spoofing signal gradually drifts
from the genuine signal. Eventually, the attacker can
control the target without being detected. Reference [3]
presents a portable civilian GPS spoofer using low-cost
hardware such as digital signal processors and a
software-based spoofing module. In addition, the
spoofer is small enough to be placed near the antenna of
the victim. Reference[4] presents the outcome of GPS
spoofing attack generating resonant oscillations in the
HVDC system. The possible outcome of GPS spoofing
attacks on PMUs includes the PMU clock offset attackresearchers [5] formulate an optimization scheme to
achieve an attack to manipulate the PMU clocks while
avoiding detection by abrupt or inconsistent changes in
the signals, regardless of the number of visible satellites.
PMU applications in power grids include multiple
aspects[6]–[8]: power system monitoring such as state
estimation; power system control, such as damping
electromechanical oscillations; The hardware-in-theloop experiment in reference [9] proves that the power
control functions can be compromised during a GPS
spoofing attack. Another application of PMU is power
system protection, such as transmission line protection
[10]. One of the line protection schemes is line
differential protection. Differential protection relies
heavily on the synchronization of measurement data
from different locations. There are two methods[11] to
conduct the synchronization: channel-based and
external time reference based. The former uses the
knowledge of time delay in the channel, it is an
approximate method and performs poorly when the
channel is not symmetrical. The latter usually use GPS
in practice. For instance, a pair of PMUs can be placed
at the terminals of the transmission line, and the sum of
current phasor measurements are used to detect the
possible fault inside the line. For a line with low line
charging, the sum is always close to zero under the
normal operating state. The GPS spoofing attack,
however, will alter the phase angle of the current phasor
and will affect the sum. The line may be tripped by the
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relay even though there is no fault in the line. Therefore,
the attackers can initiate a misoperation via GPS
spoofing techniques. Precision Time Protocol (PTP)
is able to synchronize the clocks in multiple devices
inside the substations[12]. The use of PTP does not
alleviate the effects of a GPS spoofing attack. The use
of PTP to synchronize different substations long
distances apart is not practical and cost-prohibitive.
Another possible outcome of the GPS spoofing attack is
the shift of frequency measurements in PMUs.
Researchers[13] propose to detect GPS spoofing via
calculations based on PMU frequency measurements.
In this paper, we investigate the performance of the
line differential protection scheme under GPS spoofing
attacks, including the percentage differential method
and alpha-plane protection method. GPS spoofing
attacks with different attack angles are simulated to
study the possibility of misoperation. We also propose a
three-phase quasi-dynamic state estimation based
method[14], [15] to detect GPS spoofing attacks and
recover the actual measurement data from the
compromised data. This state-estimation-based method
work with electrical and mechanical measurements and
physically based device models to monitor the state of
the power system. It has the additional capability of
identifying the compromised PMUs as well as the
source of the altered timing signals and therefore it is
useful in containing and repairing the attack. This
method is proved to be able to detect spoofing attacks
with high sensitivity. In addition, the estimated state and
the system model are utilized to recover the actual
measurement during the spoofing attack. This paper
aims to illustrate that with the recovered measurements
data from state estimation, the misoperation of line
differential protection scheme can be avoided and
ensure the reliability of the relays. The rest of the paper
is organized as follows. Section 2 describes how GPS
spoofing attacks the output of PMUs. Section 3
introduces the performance of percentage line
differential protection during GPS spoofing attacks.
Section 4 describes the effect of the spoofing attack on
alpha-plane line differential protection. Section 5
presents the quasi-dynamic state-estimation-based
algorithm used in the attack detection and mitigation
method. A numerical example demonstrates that the
proposed method eliminates relay misoperations.
Section 6 summarizes the performance of the relays and
effectiveness of the mitigation method.

2. PMU under GPS Spoofing Attack
Phasor measurement units collect and stream
measured phasor values with timestamps. Inside PMUs,
GPS signals are used as the time reference to
synchronously sample waveforms and assign the time
stamp to the output phasors (best performing PMUs

have a typical accuracy of 1 s ). As mentioned in the
previous section, the existence of GPS spoofing attacks
severely reduces the reliability of the GPS signal [16].
As a result, the GPS signal received by PMU could be
contaminated and subject to any modification from the
attacker. The attack studied in this paper is to delay the
authentic GPS signal by a specific time delay tdelay ,
which is depicted in Figure 1. A sophisticated GPS
spoofing attack transmits fabricated GPS signals, which
may appear genuine but will shift the time reference in
the receiver without being detected. In this case, the time
shift in the clock of PMU will translate into a phase shift
in the output phasor. All voltage measurements and
current measurements that use the spoofed GPS receiver
will exhibit a delay angle  delay . An example of this
process is shown in Equation (1):
I 2m1 (t ) = I 21 (t )  exp( jtdelay0 ) = I 21 (t )  exp( jdelay )

(1)

where  0 is the angular frequency of the system,
I 21 ( t ) are the phasors that would have been computed
without the assumed GPS spoofing and I 21m (t ) are the
phasors computed with the GPS spoofed signal.
Two line differential protection schemes are
discussed and investigated in this paper: percentage
differential and alpha plane differential.

Figure 1: GPS Spoofing Attack Illustration

3. Percentage Line Differential Protection
The
introduction
of
GPS
synchronized
measurements and fiber optic communications greatly
reduce the complexity of differential protection of
transmission lines. Specifically, GPS synchronized
measurements enable the simultaneous measurement of
voltages and currents at remote terminals of a line.
These measurements are time-tagged and are
communicated via fiberoptic to the location of the relay.
The relay can time align the measurements and perform
a differential protection function with minimal
interference from the communication latency. However,
the GPS spoofing attack will largely reduce the accuracy
of the time stamp and the misoperation of relays is
possible. In this section, the percentage line differential
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protection method is investigated during the GPS
spoofing attack.

3.1 Line charging is minimal
First, the case with no line charging is studied. If
B  0 (short line), the magnitude of current in the line
equals rated current, and there is no fault inside the line,
then:

(

 = y ( v1 − v2 ) 1 − e jS
I op


I op

Figure 2: Simplified Line Model

I res are two key metrics in the percentage differential
protection, they are calculated as:
I op = i1 + i2

1
( i1 + i2 )
2
The currents i1 , i2 are the current flowing into the
transmission line at the two terminals. To derive
simplified expressions, a simplified transmission line
model (pi-model) is used as shown in Figure 2. The
impedance of the line equals r + jx and the line
charging is jB . Therefore, the current can be calculated
as
y = 1/ ( r + jx )

(

y ( v1 − v2 ) 1 − e jS

=

I op  K1 I R

(2)

AND I op / I res  K 2

(3)

where I R is the rated current of the transmission line.
K1 , K 2 are user-defined constants.
Assume the target of the GPS spoofing attack is
substation 2 and the attack angle is  s , the current
j
measurement at substation 2 becomes i2 = i2 e s . As a
result, the operating current and restraining current are
calculated as:
B
B
 = i1 + i2 = y ( v1 − v2 ) (1 − e j ) + j v1 + j v2 e j
I op
2
2
S

 =
I res

1
( i1 + i2
2

)

1
B
1
B 
= y ( v1 − v2 ) + j v1 +  y ( v2 − v1 ) + j v2  e j S
2
2
2
2 
1
B
1
B
= y ( v1 − v2 ) + j v1 + y ( v2 − v1 ) + j v2 = I res
2
2
2
2

S

)

1 − e j S  K1

I res =

B
i1 = y ( v1 − v2 ) + j v1
2
B
i2 = y ( v2 − v1 ) + j v2 y = 1/ ( r + jx )
2
The percentage differential relay will trip if:

= I R 1 − e j S

= 1 − e jS
1
1
y ( v1 − v2 ) + y ( v2 − v1 )
2
2
The percentage line differential will trip if
expression (2) and expression (3) are satisfied.
Expression (2):
I op  K1 I R

I res

The operating current I op and restraining current

)

 k1   s  2 −  k 1
where  k1 = acos (1 − K12 / 2 )
Expression (3):

  K2
I op / I res
1 − e j S  K 2

 k 2   s  2 −  k 2

where  k 2 = arccos (1 − K 22 / 2 ) .

If K1 = 0.05, K 2 = 0.2 ,
then  k1 = 0.05 rad , k 2 = 0.2 rad
In this case, if the attack angle is in the range
0.2   s  2 − 0.2 , then the percentage line differential
relay will disconnect the line from the grid even though
there is no fault. Therefore, the misoperation occurs due
to the GPS spoofing attack.

3.2 Line charging is not minimal
If line charging is not minimal, the value of B will
affect the response of the relay to the attack. In this
section, the following parameters are used to calculate it
numerically.

y = 1/ ( 0.01 + 0.08i )
v2 = 1.0

v1 = v2 e0.5i
I R = y ( v1 − v2 )

The value of B changes from 0 to 0.4 (pu). And the
 / I R and I op / I res
 in terms of  s are shown
value of I op
in Figure 3 and Figure 4 correspondingly. The region
above the threshold (dotted line) corresponds to the
attack angle that leads to the misoperation of the relay.
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 / IR
Figure 3: Percentage Line Differential I op

 / IR
Figure 5: Percentage Line Differential, I op
in terms of the length of the line

 / I res

Figure 4: Percentage Line Differential I op
Similarly, we can present the results in terms of the
length of the line l (km). The parameters used are:

 / I res

Figure 6: Percentage Line Differential, I op

y ( l ) = 1/ ( ( 0.025 + 0.2i ) l )

in terms of the length of the line

B ( l ) = 0.001l

4. Alpha-plane Line differential Protection

v2 ( l ) = 1.0
v1 ( l ) = v2 (l ) exp(0.001i * l )
I R ( l ) = y ( l ) ( v1 ( l ) − v2 ( l ) )

The length of the line changes from 10 km to 410
 / I R and I op / I res
 in terms of
km. And the value of I op

 s are shown in Figure 5 and Figure 6 correspondingly.
The region above the threshold (dotted line) corresponds
to the attack angle that leads to the misoperation of the
relay. It is worth noting that when the differential
protection is equipped with line charging current
compensation and the compensation reduces the effect
of line charging completely, the results in the previous
section with minimal line charging are applicable.

Another type of line differential protection is the
alpha-plane line differential protection. This method is
based on transmitting the measured current phasor from
one end of the line to the other and taking the ratio of
the current phasors at the two ends of the line. For an
ideal line and neglecting the capacitive current of the
line, this ratio will be exactly -1.0. If there is an internal
fault in the line the ratio of the current phasor will be
different than -1.0. Because of the capacitive current of
the line, the ratio of the currents will deviate from -1.0.
Therefore, a region of restraint and this relay will trip if:
I res / I R  K 3
(4)
AND   Ω 4
(5)
In which,
 = i2 / i1

1
( i1 + i2 )
2
I R is the rated current of the transmission line.
K 3 is a user-defined constant, and Ω 4 is a userdefined restraint region in the complex plane, which is
defined by Rin , Rout and  Ω 4 . This is illustrated in
Figure 7.
I res =
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7
6
Rin = 0.3, Rout = 3.0
where l is the length of the line.
 / I R in (4) for the alphaIn Figure 8, the value of I res
plane method is plotted. It is clear that the value of
 / I R is constant when  s varies. Therefore, this
I res
condition will not be affected by the spoofing attack.
When there is no internal fault in the line, the
misoperation due to a GPS spoofing attack is unlikely.
However, during a through fault this value may exceed
the setting and the relay may misoperate during a GPS
spoofing attack.

Ω4 = 

Figure 7: Alpha-plane Characteristics

4.1 Line charging is minimal

For short lines, B  0 , if there is no internal fault and
the magnitude of the current is rated current. Then the
restraining current can be calculated as:
1
1
 =
I res
i1 + i2 e j s = ( i1 + i2 ) = I res = I R
2
2
Therefore the expression (4) will not be affected by
the GPS spoofing attack. In other words, if there is no
internal fault, the current flowing through the line is less
than the rated value I R and K 3  1 , the condition will
not be satisfied regardless of the attack angle.
The  in expression (5) is calculated as:
y ( v2 − v1 ) e j s
i

'= 2 =
= −e j s  Ω 4 →|  s | Ω4
i1
y ( v1 − v2 )
2

(

)

Therefore, this condition will be satisfied if the
spoofing attack angle is inside the trip region. In
summary, when there is no fault inside the protected
line, the misoperation of alpha-plane line differential
protection due to GPS spoofing attack is unlikely,
because the value of the expression (4) is not affected.

4.2 Line charging is not minimal
If B is not minimal, the performance of the alphaplane method is studied numerically. The parameters of
the line and relay are:
y ( l ) = 1/ ( ( 0.025 + 0.2i ) l )

 / I R in Alpha-plane
Figure 8 Value of I res

In Figure 9, the points corresponding to   under
different angles are plotted. Also, the length of the line
changes from 10km to 410km. The magnitude of  
remains constant and the angle of   varies as  s
changes. For most points with |  s |  Ω 4 ,   is in the
restraint region. However, line charging will shift the
angles of the points, and push them clockwise. The
zoomed-in view is shown in Figure 10. This lead to the
unsymmetrical behavior for  s = 7 / 12  
and
 s = −7 / 12   . When  s = −7 / 12   the point
corresponds to   will enter the trip region. In addition,
as the length of the line increase, which indicates the
increase of the line charging, the point will move away
from the boundary. In other words, for a longer
transmission line, the effective attack angle leading to
the relay misoperation is smaller.

B ( l ) = 0.001l
v2 ( l ) = 1.0

v1 ( l ) = v2 (l ) exp(0.001i * l )
I R ( l ) = y ( l ) ( v1 ( l ) − v2 ( l ) )
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relating to the measurement, and h j ( x ( t ) ) provides the
measurement j as a function of the state. Note that in the
case of QDSE, the function h j ( x ( t ) ) is based on the
transient model of the power system. The dimension of
x ( t ) equals N, including, bus voltage magnitudes, phase
angles, generator speed, etc. The dimension of z ( t )
equals M, including, voltage phasor measurement,
current phasor measurement, generator speed
measurement, virtual measurement, etc.  2 describes
the consistency between the measurement value and the
estimation model. Pr (  2 , ) is the Chi-square
cumulative probability distribution function, and P is
the confidence level,  is the difference between the
number of measurements and states (degree of
freedom). A low confidence level corresponds to
inconsistency between measurement value and the
measurement model. This can be utilized to detect the
internal fault of the device and bad data in the
measurements[14].
To utilize more measurements related to the
electromechanical dynamics in the system, the quasidynamic state estimation (QDSE) method is proposed.
The expression h j ( x ( t ) ) uses the transient model of the

Figure 9 Value of   in Alpha-plane

Figure 10 Value of   in Alpha-plane, near the
trip region boundaries

5. GPS Spoofing Attack Detection and
Recovery
To reduce the effect of GPS spoofing attack on line
differential protection schemes, a quasi-dynamic stateestimation-based method is used to detect the attack. In
addition, this method can recover the actual PMU
measurement
data
from
the
compromised
measurements.

5.1 Quasi-Dynamic State Estimation
The quasi-dynamic state estimation (QDSE)
algorithm utilizes measurements to obtain an optimal
estimate of the states of the grid. In this paper, we
formulate the quasi-dynamic state estimator as an
unconstrained state estimation problem[14], [15]:

 hj ( x (t )) − z j (t ) 
min  =  



x (t )
j
j =1 

2
P = 1 − Pr(  , )

2

M

2

(6)
(7)

where x ( t ) is the state vector, z j ( t ) is the j th
measurement value,  j is the standard deviation

system resulting in dynamic relationships between
measurements and states. For example, the variation of
mechanical speed and the angle of rotors in generators
and motors are considered in QDSE. Therefore, the
proposed method increases the number of
measurements. In general, more measurements lead to
increased robustness of the state estimation against
noise and attacks. In addition, the quasi-dynamic state
estimation uses a three-phase model. The incorporation
of the three-phase model ensures accurate estimation
results even though when accommodating an
unbalanced and asymmetric system [17]. The inclusion
of the transient model enables QDSE to yield more
accurate results[18], compared with traditional state
estimation. The well-known  2 test is used to verify the
performance of state estimation. The  2 value is used
to calculate the confidence level P. When the confidence
level P drops below a predefined threshold Pth , then the
inputs of the state estimation are abnormal. The root
cause is determined by hypothesis testing. The phasor
measurements in the suspected substation under GPS
spoofing attack are replaced with magnitude
measurements. The modified measurements and
remaining measurements are transmitted to QDSE and
the confidence level is computed again, and the value is
P’. A GPS spoofing attack is identified if this hypothesis
test passes, i.e. P '  Pth . The estimated measurements
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are evaluated without the effect of spoofing attack and
these recovered measurements are streamed to relays.
Meanwhile, the attack angle can be revealed through
another approach: for all phasor measurements coming
from a group of PMUs that are connected to the same
GPS clock, we introduce an unknown time shift
expressed in a phase angle. Each phasor in this group
becomes:
Am = Atrue e j
The value of the introduced phase angle represents the
phase shift caused by the GPS spoofing. Note this
approach introduces one unknown variable for each
group of PMUs connected to the same GPS clock. In
general, a GPS attack is local and in most cases there is
one GPS clock for each substation. Thus the approach
introduces an additional unknown, one for each
substation. The state estimation provides the value of
this unknown and therefore quantifies the attack.

5.2 Numerical Results

s =


12

( t − 0.5 ) ( u ( t − 0.5 ) − u ( t − 1.5 ) )

(8)

Figure 12: Relay Performance under Attack
The performance of the relay is shown in Figure 12.
m
m
The magnitude and angle of measurement I12 , I 21 are
plotted in the first two rows. It is obvious that the
difference between im12 and  −mi 21 , which are the angle
of I12m and ( − I 21m ) correspondingly, increases after the

attack starts. The magnitude of I op increases as a result.
Though there is no internal fault of the line, the relay
issues a trip decision after I op / I R and I op / I res exceed
the threshold. The misoperation of line differential
protection due to GPS spoofing attack is verified.

Figure 11: Illustrative Test Case
The quasi-dynamic state estimation method is
utilized to detect and eliminate the impact of GPS
spoofing attack on line differential protection. The test
case used for illustration is shown in Figure 11. All the
measurements from 4 substations are depicted in the
figure, including voltage measurement, current
measurement, and rotor speed measurements. The target
of the attack is substation 1, therefore all measurements
captured at substation 1 will be affected, including
I12 , I13 , I14 and V1 . The attack angle follows the equation
(8), where u ( t ) is the unit step function. In practice,
attackers are likely to ramp up  s to escape abrupt
change detection so a ramp function is also included.
The investigated protection zone includes the
transmission line from substation 1 to substation 2. A
percentage differential protection scheme is
implemented with measurement I12 from substation 1
and I 21 from substation 2.

Figure 13: QDSE Results
To eliminate the impact of GPS spoofing attack on
the relay, the QDSE method utilizes the measurements
from all 4 substations and estimates the states of the
network, including the bus voltages, generator rotor
angles, etc. Then, estimated measurements are
generated from the estimated states. Iˆ12 , for example, is
the estimated measurements, which can verify the field
m
measurement I12 . The overall distance between
measurements and field measurements are denoted as
 2 , which is plotted in Figure 13. The increase of  2
and decrease of P indicate the discrepancy between
measurement value and the system model. Since the
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major discrepancy comes from measurements at
substation 1, a hypothesis test is conducted with an
alternative formulation of the QDSE. The complex
measurements at substation are replaced with magnitude
only:

(
→( I
→( I
→( I

V1mr , V1im → V1m
I12m r , I12m i
I13m r , I13mi
I14m r , I14m i

m
12

m
13
m
14

)
)
)
)

2

= (V1mr ) + (V1im )

2

= ( I12m r ) + ( I12m i )

2

= ( I13m r ) + ( I13mi )

2

= ( I14m r ) + ( I14m i )

2

2

2

2

2

2

measurements model corresponding to voltage/current
measurements in substation 1 are revised as:
hi ( x(t )) = hi ( x(t )) exp( j s )
The solution of the revised QDSE has one addition
estimation state ˆs , which is shown in Figure 16. The
estimated phase shift is highly consistent with the actual
attack angle. Therefore, the GPS spoofing attack is
quantified.

2

2

The result of the hypothesis test is shown in Figure
2
14. The  value remains low and the confidence level
is close to 1. Therefore, the cause of the abnormality in
state estimation is verified and the spoofing attack is
detected. In addition, the estimated measurements of the
QDSE are used to recover the affected measurements.
They are provided for the relay and the performance is
shown in Figure 15. The value of I op / I R and I op / I res
remain minimal and misoperation is avoided.
Figure 16: QDSE Result with Attack Angle as
State

6. Conclusion

Figure 14: QDSE Result with Alternative
Formulation

Figure 15: Relay Performance with Recovered
Measurements
In addition, we can enhance the state estimation by
introducing an additional state to represent the phase
shift caused by the GPS spoofing. Therefore, all the

This paper presents the effect of GPS spoofing
attack on PMU based transmission line differential
protective relays. The misoperation of the relay is
observed in percentage line differential protection. If the
spoofing attack angle is larger than the threshold, which
is determined by the relay characteristics, the relay will
trip even though there is no internal fault in the line.
Therefore, the malicious attacker can substantially
disturb the normal operation of the power grid. These
results from numerical simulations can be further
enhanced with real transmission line parameters and
system states, which allow protection engineers to
assess the vulnerability of a particular system to possible
attacks. The inclusion of negative-sequence and zerosequence components will be studied in future work. In
addition, this paper presents a quasi-dynamic stateestimation-based method to detect GPS spoofing attacks
and recover the actual measurements. This method
utilizes a dynamic model of the system and higher
redundancy measurements such as three-phase
measurements, generator speed, virtual measurements,
etc. The numerical results show that the method can
detect the attack immediately. This method also enables
the recovery of corrected measurements, eliminating the
misoperation of the line differential protection scheme.
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